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Is it possible to turn psychology into “hard science”? Physics of the mind follows the
fundamental methodology of physics in all areas where physics have been developed.
What is common among Newtonian mechanics, statistical physics, quantum physics,
thermodynamics, theory of relativity, astrophysics... and a theory of superstrings? The
common among all areas of physics is a methodology of physics discussed in the first
few lines of the paper. Is physics of the mind possible? Is it possible to describe the
mind based on the few first principles as physics does? The mind with its variabilities
and uncertainties, the mind from perception and elementary cognition to emotions and
abstract ideas, to high cognition. Is it possible to turn psychology and neuroscience
into “hard” sciences? The paper discusses established first principles of the mind, their
mathematical formulations, and amathematical model of themind derived from these first
principles, mechanisms of concepts, emotions, instincts, behavior, language, cognition,
intuitions, conscious and unconscious, abilities for symbols, functions of the beautiful and
musical emotions in cognition and evolution. Some of the theoretical predictions have
been experimentally confirmed. This research won national and international awards.
In addition to summarizing existing results the paper describes new development
theoretical and experimental. The paper discusses unsolved theoretical problems as well
as experimental challenges for future research.
Keywords: physics of the mind, neuroscience, cognition, dynamic logic, knowledge instinct, aesthetic emotions,
consciousness, beautiful
WHAT IS PHYSICS OF THE MIND?
The common to all areas of physics is a methodology that first, concentrates on finding few
fundamental laws and their mathematical formulations; second, a mathematical theory developed
from these few “first principles” that explains a vast area of knowledge without contradicting known
facts; third, makes unexpected theoretical predictions, which could be verified experimentally, and
actual experimental verifications which confirm or disconfirm the theory.
This paper briefly summarizes previously developed aspects of the physical theory of the mind
and presents new developments. It discusses the first principles identified by a number of leading
neuroscientists, mathematical methods suitable for their modeling, perception and cognition
mechanisms based on these principles, the mechanisms of an approximate mental hierarchy. The
physics of the mind and the related mathematical theory are extended toward the dual hierarchy of
interactions between cognition and language, high cognition including emotions of the beautiful, a
controversial idea of the meaning of life, as well as functions of these high principles in cognition.
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It is further extended toward emotional prosody of speech
as well as cognitive functions and the reasons for evolution
of musical emotions from animal cries to Bach and Justin
Bieber.
This theory does not contradict existing knowledge, explains
psychological facts that have been poorly understood previously,
and has made a number of unexpected experimentally verifiable
predictions. The paper discusses theoretical predictions that
have been experimentally confirmed (or tentatively confirmed).
Among these confirmed predictions are mechanisms of
perception and cognition, mathematical model of the mind
that overcomes computational complexity, interaction between
cognition and language, the nature and mechanisms of the
beautiful and the meaning of life, as well as the cognitive
functions and reasons for origin and evolution of musical
emotions. Computational complexity interfered with modeling
the mind, artificial intelligence and machine learning since
the 1960s, a mathematical theory overcoming this difficulty
is described. The paper presents physics of the mind that
mathematically models psychological mechanisms at the
functional level. Self-organization processes are related to
thermodynamics and informational theories. The functional
theory has been partly related to neural mechanisms, and some
of these relations have been experimentally confirmed. The
paper discusses predictions, which open vast areas for future
research.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
MIND-BRAIN
This section describes several fundamental principles of the
mind-brain, later the paper describes mathematical models for
some of them.
Concepts are a mechanism of understanding objects, events,
and abstract ideas. Their contents are stored in neural
representations. In the processes of perception concepts project
their contents to the visual cortex to match sensory projections.
Concepts are also called mental models of events and objects. In
a simple case a concept is memory. The analogy with models is
literal and neural representations are also called mental models.
Mathematical models of concept mechanisms is discussed in
(Perlovsky et al., 1997, 2011; Perlovsky, 2006a). Proof of detailed
theoretical predictions of the mechanism in experimental neuro-
imaging, including detailed descriptions of the brain regions
involved was obtained by Bar et al. (2006) and Kveraga et al.
(2007). The moment of perception is a match of these images.
Instincts are ancient mechanisms of survival. This paper
follows Grossberg and Levine (1987) theory, which has been
modeled mathematically and is appropriate for developing
physics of the mind. This theory considers the instinct
mechanism resembling “neural sensors that measure vital
parameters important for functioning and survival” (Grossberg
and Levine, 1987; Perlovsky, 2006a). For example, a low blood
glucose level specifies an instinctual need for food.Measurements
of glucose level sensors and the requirement to keep glucose level
within bounds is a mechanism of instinct.
Emotions designate various mechanisms which are surveyed
in a number of publications. Following Grossberg and Levine
(1987) theory of drives and emotions the mechanism of emotions
are neural signals connecting instinctual and conceptual brain
regions. Emotions, emotional neural signals, related states
and feelings communicate instinctual needs to conceptual
recognition-understanding mechanisms. Their function
is to motivate behavioral and conceptual representation-
models, which correspond to objects or events that can
potentially satisfy instinctual needs, so that these models receive
preferential attention and processing resources within the brain.
Thus emotions evaluate concepts for the purpose of instinct
satisfaction. Emotional signals and related states of the mind are
felt as emotional feelings.
Psychological research of emotions is usually limited to basic
emotions, which are related to satisfaction of bodily instinctual
needs, named by specific words, and limited in number to a
few different emotions. There are only few basic emotions; they
are a small part of our emotional abilities, the most ancient
and noticeable ones. Our higher cognitive abilities involve
many “continuous” emotions, which include aesthetic emotions
discussed later, related to knowledge, including processes of
learning, emotions in the voice prosody, emotions of cognitive
dissonances, as well as musical emotions described later.
Behaviour is governed by several mechanisms. The most
interesting for the initial development of physics of the mind
is the mechanism of behavioral concepts; it is similar to the
mechanism of cognitive concepts discussed above with the
difference that behavioral concepts govern behavior. Most of
human behavior occurs in the mind, it is directed at improving
concepts, understanding, and knowledge.
Cognitive hierarchy is an approximately hierarchical structure
(Kosslyn, 1980; Grossberg, 1988) of mental models and
aesthetic emotions (discussed later) extending from sensory-
motor representations at the bottom of the hierarchy, higher up
to concepts of objects, contexts, situations, and many levels of
abstract concepts, to the top of the hierarchy, which content will
be elucidated in the paper. This description is not quite accurate,
especially for neural mechanisms below objects; one can look
for details e.g., in Grossberg publications, but it is adequate for
higher levels. The hierarchy is functional, it is not organized from
the bottom to the top along a specific geometric axis. Processes
of understanding involve interactions among models at lower
and higher levels. In these interactions higher level models are
improved for better correspondence to lower level models; a
higher level model unify lower level ones for creating a more
abstract and general concept. The interaction is two-way: lower
level models are also improved for better match to the details of
the situation (lower level models) and for better matching the top
level one. Neural signals involved in these interactions are called
bottom-up, BU, and top-down, TD, signals.
The knowledge instinct, KI, is a special instinctual mechanism
related to knowledge acquisition and improvement of concept-
models (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006a, 2007b, 2008b; Perlovsky et al.,
2011). Its model is an extension of Grossberg and Levine
(1987) theory of bodily instincts to cognition. KI is similar to
other instincts, it involves sensor-like neural mechanisms that
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measures similarities between patterns in sensor data and mental
models, or more generally between BU and TD signals. As
discussed later, in humans and other higher animals mental
models are vague, and matching them to objects and situations
requires adapting them to BU signals. KI drives this adaptation.
No perception or cognition would be possible without KI. For
this reason KI is a most important instinct. KI is not related to
bodily needs but to “higher” needs for cognition and in this sense
it can be termed a higher instinct.
Aesthetic emotions are related to satisfaction of KI and they
are modeled mathematically by changes in KI. This theoretical
prediction have been experimentally confirmed (Perlovsky et al.,
2010; Schoeller and Perlovsky, 2015, 2016). Relation of aesthetic
emotions to knowledge was established by Kant (1790), although
he could not formulate his thoughts withmathematical precision,
the adequate mathematics did not exist at the time. His thoughts
have not been understood by his followers. Aesthetic emotions
are related to learning and understanding at every level of the
mental hierarchy, understanding is pleasant (Perlovsky, 2001,
2006a; Perlovsky et al., 2011; Schoeller and Perlovsky, 2015,
2016). But we do not relate understanding at lower levels to the
beautiful. Later this paper connects aesthetic emotions to the
emotions of the beautiful.
Perception of objects refers to recognition of more or less
familiar objects, and sometimes to noticing unfamiliar objects.
Visual perception involves neural projections of retinal images
to the visual cortex (BU). At the same time existing models
(of expected objects) project TD signals to the visual cortex
(TD). Driven by KI (or in other words, motivated by aesthetic
emotions) TD and BU projections of models on the visual cortex
are modified to match each other. When match is successful,
perception occurs (Grossberg, 1988). This process is modeled
mathematically (Perlovsky et al., 2011), and detailed predictions
of this model are experimentally confirmed (Bar et al., 2006;
Kveraga et al., 2007).
The above principles describe self-organization of conceptual
and emotional mechanisms of perception and cognition. They
encompass the mechanisms of imagination, intuition, planning,
conscious, unconscious, and others, including higher abilities
and aesthetic emotions (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006a, 2010d; Perlovsky
et al., 2011). Most brain operations are unconscious, for example,
individual neuronal firings usually can never be accessed by
consciousness. This paper refers to the brain-mind neural
processes that are not accessible to consciousness as being
unconscious, and there are various degrees of unconsciousness.
Some processes could never become conscious; others can
be accessed by consciousness with significant mental effort,
as in creative processes; still others become conscious under
changing circumstances without special effort. Many theoretical
predictions have been confirmed in experiments (Kosslyn, 1980;
Grossberg, 1988; Perlovsky et al., 2010; Schoeller and Perlovsky,
2015, 2016).
Vague Representations.Mental models are not crisp like visual
perceptions. A simple experiment can prove this. Look at an
object in front of you and then recollect this object with closed
eyes. This visual imagination is vague, one cannot recollect even a
simple everyday object in all details with closed eyes. Imagination
is a TD neural projection from memory to the visual cortex.
Vagueness of imaginations is a consequence of vagueness of
mental models (Perlovsky, 2016b).
This property of models is fundamental for perception. The
reason is that an object would never appear exactly same as
during previous perceptions; angles, lightings, surrounding
objects would always be different. Therefore previously
remembered objects would not match new object projections
from retina to visual cortex. Attempts in artificial intelligence
(AI) to recognize objects by matching sensory images to previous
images took many years and resulted in failures. The number
of possible modifications of previous images to match a new
image, are combinatorially large. This number is larger than
all interactions of all elementary particles in the Universe,
therefore the resulting complexity is unsolvable. The problem is
called combinatorial complexity, CC (Perlovsky, 1998). Vague
models avoid a need to consider combinations. The vague-to-
crisp process is fundamental for self-organization, perception
and cognition; vague representations and processes are not
conscious, possibly for this reason vagueness of representations
has not been appreciated by psychologists and mathematicians
modeling the mind, and this is the reason why mind processes
have not been mathematically modeled and understood in
artificial intelligence (Perlovsky, 2001; Russell and Norvig,
2010).
Dynamic logic, DL, is a mathematical technique modeling
the brain-mind mechanism of matching vague models to crisp
projections from the retina (Perlovsky, 2001, 2006a, 2013c;
Perlovsky et al., 2011). Adequacy of DL vague-to-crisp process
has been experimentally proven in (Bar et al., 2006; Kveraga
et al., 2007). M. Bar and colleagues proved that the initial state
of models is vague. The process “from vague to crisp” until
models match retinal projections take approximately 150ms.
These includes many neuronal operations: about 10ms per
firing of a neuron, while tens of thousands of neurons are
participating in parallel. The initial part of this process cannot be
accessed by consciousness, vague models and processes are not
accessible to consciousness. Conscious perceptions occur only at
the moment of model-projections matching object-projections
from the retina.
DL is a process-logic, it avoids logical states until the very
end of the DL-process (Perlovsky, 2006a, 2013c). This is essential
because CC has been shown to be equivalent to Gödelian
incompleteness of logic when applied to finite systems, such
as computers or brains (Perlovsky, 2013d). It is interesting
to note that the founder of logic, Aristotle explained to his
students that logic is needed to argue what has been already
understood, but not for understanding of new phenomena, and
logic should not be used for understanding working of the mind.
Aristotelian theory of the mind is similar to DL, the mind
understand the world by using forms that today we call models
or representations. Initial states of the forms are potentialities,
which are not logical. In the process of “the mind meeting
matter”, which today we call interactions of TD and BU signals,
forms become actualities, which are logical states.
This section summarizes several fundamental principles of
the mind: instincts, emotions, concepts, cognitive hierarchy,
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the knowledge instinct, aesthetic emotions, perceptions,
vague model-representations, dynamic logic. Not all of these
principles are independent, e.g., KI and aesthetic emotions
are extensions of general principles of instincts and emotions,
vague representations are a part of dynamic logic; this repetition
is justified by importance of the correspondence principles.
Perception is a mechanism explained from fundamental
principles. Mathematical foundations of these principles have
been discussed, mathematical details will be presented later as
well as few other fundamental principles. Identification of few
fundamental principles is a first step toward developing physics
of the mind.
THE BEAUTIFUL AND MEANING OF LIFE
The mind mechanisms are organized into an approximate
hierarchy of concepts and aesthetic emotions. Cognitive
hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 1.
The hierarchical organization of cognition and related brain
structures are reviewed in (Badre, 2008). The hierarchy evolved
for the purpose of developing more abstract and general
concept-models (Perlovsky, 2006a). Consider a perception-
cognition process of an everyday situation, e.g., a professor
office. The knowledge instinct first drives the mind to perceive
and understand objects in the office: chairs, computers desks,
shelves, books... Animals also understand individual objects.
Next, the knowledge instinct drives us to understand the
concept “office” as a unity of objects. A mathematical model
of this process was developed in (Ilin and Perlovsky, 2010;
Perlovsky and Ilin, 2010a,b). The higher level abstract concepts
we understand due to corresponding concept-models, such as
“office.” Similarly, we understand a “concert hall,” and other
situations by using higher-level concepts that our mind evolved
for this purpose.
I will repeat the word purpose; every higher-level concept and
its mechanisms evolved in individual learning as well as in genetic
and cultural evolution with a purpose to be able to transform
many lower-level concepts into a unified meaning. In this
understanding lower-level concept-models acquire higher-level
meanings and develop amore abstract understanding than lower-
level meanings. This way our understanding of the surrounding
world evolves from a “book” to an “office,” to a “university”,
to an “educational system,” and so on... to models near the top
of our mental hierarchy. These “top” models “attempt to make
sense, to understand the meaning of our entire experience. We
understand-perceive-feel them as related to the meaning and
purpose of our lives” (Perlovsky, 2006a, 2010c).
Models at every level unify lower level models, for example a
situation-model symphony hall unifies lower level object-models:
chairs, listeners, scene, etc. Continuing this argument to the
top of the hierarchy, one concludes that models at the top
unify the entire life experience. These top representations are
understood as themeaning and purpose of life. As discussed, even
lower level concepts are vague. Abstract concepts built on top of
many levels of vague models are even vaguer (Perlovsky, 2011c),
therefore the meaning and purpose of life are not finite exactly
defined ideas like objects perceived with opened eyes. The next
section discusses why sometimes it may seem that we can crisply
formulate these ideas.
Learning of models at every level is driven by KI operated
at that level, or in other words is motivated by aesthetic
emotions at this level. At lower levels aesthetic emotions could
be below consciousness. At the top of the hierarchy the highest
aesthetic emotions are emotions of the beautiful, sometimes these
emotions could be strong and even produce physiological effects,
aesthetic chills (Perlovsky, 2002, 2006a, 2007c, 2008a, 2010b,c;
Mayorga and Perlovsky, 2008; Schoeller and Perlovsky, 2015,
2016).
Let me emphasize that defining emotions of the beautiful as
the highest aesthetic emotions (that is aesthetic emotions near
the top of the mental hierarchy) corresponds to a well-accepted
human intuition. Kant (1790) has been the first who related
FIGURE 1 | The hierarchy of cognition. Cognition is organized into an
approximate hierarchy of concepts from objects to abstract concepts and
higher up to the highest cognitive concepts of the meaning and purpose.
Aesthetic emotions function as motivators of learning concepts at every level,
at the top of the hierarchy these are the emotions of the beautiful.
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beautiful to the meaning and purpose of human life, yet
his intuitions have been well ahead of understandings of his
contemporaries. The only widely known Kantian idea about the
beautiful is that it is “aimless purposiveness,” often with emphasis
on aimless, because the purposiveness of the beautiful is not
understood even in contemporar y aesthetics. This is clearly seen
when visiting museums of contemporary art.
While progress in understanding of the purpose of human
life can be seen in art evolution from cave art to the 19th
century, in the 20th century art the exploration of purposiveness
has been disappearing. In rare pieces of contemporary art the
meaning and purpose of life is explored. This ignoring Kantian
intuitions in contemporary art is likely to be closely related to
the fact that the idea of “science” become important in cultural
life (without understanding of what science is). Existing science
does not understand what is beautiful. For example, G. Dickie,
an influential philosopher of art, a president of the American
Society for Aesthetics, and author of popular textbooks developed
an “institutional theory of aesthetics” which defines beautiful as
what has been accepted as beautiful by respected art institutions;
it is still widely accepted as a state of the art in understanding
of the beauty. In wide culture beautiful is understood as more
related to sex than to the meaning of life. In university courses
on aesthetics beauty is related to shapes, colors, forms, and
progressive social uses of art, rather than to the purposiveness of
life. So, I would again emphasize that the theoretically predicted
properties of the emotions of the beautiful, their relations to the
meaning of life are unexpected in contemporary aesthetics and
contradictory to accepted views. Nevertheless these theoretical
predictions have been experimentally tested and confirmed
(Schoeller and Perlovsky, 2015, 2016), which is the fundamental
property of the science of physics of the mind.
This section gives an example of complicated cognitive
mechanisms explained from the first principles, and making
theoretical predictions that have been tested in experiments.
THE DUAL HIERARCHY, LANGUAGE, AND
COGNITION
The recognition that language and cognition are not the
same, that these abilities are served by different mechanisms
of the mind, began a revolution in 20th century linguistics
initiated by N. Chomsky (1957). Many psycholinguists and
evolutionary linguists today disagree with Chomsky’s complete
separation of language from cognition (Cangelosi and Parisi,
2002; Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Steels, 2011), yet many
questions remained unanswered. What is the difference between
cognition and language? Language is so important for thinking
that it is difficult to comprehend what cognition would be
without language. How does cognition interact with language?
Do we think with words, or only use words as labels when a
chunk of a thinking process is complete? There is virtually infinite
number of possible associations between words and objects, so
how is it possible that every child learns correct associations?
Why children learn language by the age of 5 or 7, but do not
think like adults until much later? What exactly are the changes
in neural mechanisms? Do adults really understand what they
say, and what does it mean to really understand? Some people are
good at speaking language, while not equally good in discussing
with other people, or understanding the real world. Opposite
examples could be found. The science needs to understand the
mechanisms of language and cognition interactions; why they
are so interdependent, and so separate?What neural mechanisms
animals need to learn language?
These questions and many more can be explored with
adding one fundamental principle to those previously discussed.
Dual model (Perlovsky, 2004, 2006a, 2007a,b, 2009a, 2013b)
is a fundamental principle of the mind modeling interaction
between language and cognition. According to the dual model,
every mental model has a cognitive and language parts.
Their initial states are vague. In a newborn brain most of
cognitive and language models are placeholders without specific
contents.
Adding dual models to the cognitive hierarchy in Figure 1
leads to two parallel hierarchies of language and cognition
shown in Figure 2 (Perlovsky, 2006a, 2009a, 2013b). In childhood
language representations are learned fast and become crisp and
conscious. This is possible because language acquisition relies
on language spoken around, in which contents of language
models, words, phrases, are “ready-made” for learning. But
many cognitive models remain vague until much later; cognitive
learning is much more difficult, because cognitive models do not
exist in the world “ready for learning.” At an early age, everyone
can talk about good guys and bad guys, but nobody even at 40
FIGURE 2 | The dual hierarchy model (see Perlovsky, 2006a). Language
and cognition are organized into approximate dual hierarchy. Every
representation has two parts, cognitive and language. Learning language is
grounded in the surrounding language throughout the hierarchy. Cognitive
hierarchy is grounded in experience only at the very “bottom”; the cognitive
hierarchy is constructed from experience guided by language.
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or 80, can use these concepts without errors in real life. Ideas of
good and evil have been discussed for millennia.
Throughout the hierarchy, linguistic parts of representations
are crisp and conscious in every mind at an early age, but equally
crisp and conscious cognitive models my never be understood.
Representations of objects are acquired early, alongside with
language, because we see objects ready-made for cognitive
learning. But contents of abstract concepts do not exist in
the world “ready-made.” Not every combination of objects or
events is worth learning as a separate abstract concept, only
few combinations are important for understanding. Therefore
learning abstract concepts require experience guided by language.
If a concept does not exist in language, it is likely that it does not
exist in cognition, and corresponding events are not even noticed.
Many people speak words without full cognitive understanding
of what these words designate in real life. These aspects of
language-cognition have not been duly noticed or explained; the
mechanism of the dual model explains them. Language models
refer to facts of language, and not directly to events in the world.
Cognitive models combine language with experience and refer to
events in the world.
The dual model hypothesis is tentatively supported by
experimental data (Franklin et al., 2008). These authors describe
that certain representations based in the right brain hemisphere
in pre-linguistic infants are rewired to the left hemisphere as
language is acquired. Brain modules and neural connections
involved in the dual models and knowledge instinct were
discussed in (Levine and Perlovsky, 2008a,b).
The dual model has been fundamentally important for the
emergence of the hierarchy of the mind. Learning should be
grounded in experience (Cangelosi and Riga, 2006; Tikhanoff
et al., 2006; Coventry et al., 2010). But concept-models of
cognition are grounded in experience only at the lower levels
of concrete objects; at this level human abilities are not much
different from that of pre-human animals’ (Spelke and Kinzler,
2007). Understanding situations and abstract concepts cannot be
based on experience alone. The referenced publications discuss
in detail why this is mathematically impossible: there are simply
too many combinations of objects and events (more then all
elementary interactions in the life of the Universe). No life’s
experience would ever be sufficient to learn which combinations
are important for noticing them and learning as separate abstract
concepts.
The dual hierarchy model offers a resolution of an old
problem of sign and symbol (Perlovsky, 2007a). “Symbol is the
most misused word in our culture” (Deacon, 1989). “Symbol”
is used in simple cases referring to traffic signs, or axiomatic
mathematical notations, and in the most profound cases of
cultural and religious symbols. The dual model explains that a
sign corresponds to a language part of the dual model (even
if it is a part of a special sign system, such as notations in
chess or mathematics). Symbols can be used profoundly to
denote processes of sign interpretation, connecting language and
cognitive parts of the model in DL processes from vague to crisp.
The dual model answers questions formulated at the
beginning of this section; it explains how cognition interacts with
language: a cognitive process proceeds using both cognitive and
language representations. This enables thinking to be grounded
in the real world to the extent available to the thinker, and
still proceed using language whenever understanding of the real
world is insufficient. Similarly both representations are used
when speaking, depending on one’s abilities and preferences;
language or cognitive models receive preference in the speaker’s
mind. People of “speaking type” can shift between cognitive
and language models automatically and without notice, while
“cognitive types” may concentrate on cognition.
Associations between words and objects or events are learned
among virtual infinity of possible association by every child
through the process “from vague to crisp” modeled by DL. The
reason language is learned first and cognition is learned later
because language representations exist “ready for learning” in the
surrounding language, while learning cognitive representations
requires experience and guidance by language. Adults are
different from children in that a larger percentage of their
cognitive models are crisp. Still a significant part of what most
people are saying is understood only in terms of language, but
not necessarily in terms of real world entities. Animals cannot
learn language no cognitive hierarchy because they are missing a
neural mechanism of the dual language-cognitive model.
To summarize, cognitive models at higher levels are learned
based on both, life experience and language models. In this
process language guides cognition: language identifies for
cognition, which combinations of lower level concepts are
meaningful for learning as a higher level concept. Language
hierarchy is learned “ready-made” from the surrounding
language at an early age. During the rest of an individual’s life
the knowledge instinct drives the mind to learn the cognitive
hierarchy from life experience in correspondence with the
language hierarchy. If a certain idea does not exist in a language,
this idea does not exist in cognition, and corresponding events
would not even be noticed. Cognitive models are grounded
in language. Many theoretical predictions of the dual model
hierarchy in this section have not yet been experimentally proven,
they should be considered as hypotheses and their experimental
verifications are topics for future research.
This section, as the previous one, gives an example of a vast
field of complicated cognitive mechanisms explained from the
first principles, and making theoretical predictions that can be
tested in experiments; few of these predictions have been tested
experimentally. It answers many questions that could not even
have been formulated previously. Detailed mathematical models
are discussed in given references. The theory discussed in this
section is a part of physics of the mind, it is a step toward making
psychology a “hard” science.
EMOTIONALITY OF LANGUAGES AND
CULTURES
In non-human animals voice muscles are controlled from ancient
involuntary emotional centers. For this reason animal voicing
is mostly inseparable from emotions. “Voluntary control of
vocalization is limited” (Deacon, 1989; Schulz et al., 2005;
Perlovsky, 2009b; Simonyan and Horwitz, 2011). Evolution
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of language, semantically loaded voice, required to free voice
mechanisms from involuntary emotional control. For this
purpose in the course of language evolution human brain evolve
recent laryngeal control centers in cortex, which make possible
voluntary control of voice muscles.
Involuntary emotionality of voice has been significantly
reduced. With evolution of language an ability for strongly
emotional voice has mostly evolved into a separate ability
for song and music (Perlovsky, 2012c). But unconscious
emotionality of voice could not completely disappear. This
everyday low emotional prosody performs a highly important
cognitive function: it motivates connecting sounds of words
with their cognitive meanings (Perlovsky, 2011b, 2012a). Let me
emphasize this possibly non-obvious point. Language and its
main way of functioning, speech, can only function if sounds of
words are perceived emotionally. If a word sounds produce no
emotions and no motivations, this word has no meaning. I dwell
on this point because it contradicts accepted understanding.
“Emotional speech” often is used as a synonym of meaningless or
at least devoid of deep meaning, which could be true, especially
if emotionality is high and emotions overtake the reason.
Here I emphasize the opposite point: no emotionality indicates
absence of any interest, and therefore convey no meaning.
Proper emotionality is essential (Perlovsky, 2009b, 2011a). Low
emotional prosody, which is below the level of consciousness has
not been studied. This is an important area for future research.
The following part of this section makes theoretical
predictions that follow from the few basic principles formulated
above, mathematical models have been presented in given
references, and the theoretical predictions are experimentally
testable and will be tested in the near future. Emotional prosody
of human voice, even if unnoticed, affects the entire psyche and
even culture. In pre-human animals conceptual and emotional
systems (understanding and evaluation) are less differentiated
than in humans. Animal cries engage their psyche as a whole,
rather than conceptual and emotional mechanisms separately.
For example consider calls of vervet monkeys (Seyfarth and
Cheney, 2003). The calls designate types of predators around;
still “understanding of a situation (concept of danger), evaluation
(emotion of fear), and behavior (cry and jump on a tree) are not
differentiated, each call is a part of a single concept-emotion-
behavior-vocalization psychic state with very little differentiated
voluntary control” (Perlovsky, 2006a).
Humans on the opposite have separate mechanisms
of emotions, concepts, and behavior. Differentiation of
psychological states with voluntary control over each part
must have evolved contemporaneously with evolution of
language and rewiring of the brain.
It follows that language, while contributing to developing
detailed ability for concepts, also contributed to separating and
perfecting functions of concepts, emotions, and behavior. This
differentiation destroyed the unity of psyche inherited from the
pre-human past. Language evolution also led to losing unity of
psyche, started losing wholeness. While in pre-human animals
every element of knowledge is tightly connected to emotional
evaluation of a situation, and to appropriate behavior satisfying
instinctual needs, this is not so for humans. A significant part
of cultural knowledge formulated in language is not emotionally
connected to human instinctual needs. This is tremendously
advantageous for development of conceptual culture, for science,
and technology. Humans can deliberately discuss ideas.
But this freedom of deliberate conversation and clear
conceptual thinking exerts a price on human psyche. Human
psyche is not necessarily unified. Language is not directly
linked to instinctual mechanisms. Often knowledge developed
in culture does not fit with instinctual requirements that remain
our inseparable part. In addition some elements of knowledge
often contradict other elements. Human psyche must be unified
by the highest models of the meaning and purpose evolved
for this purpose at the top of the hierarchy of the mind
(Perlovsky, 2007b, 2009b, 2013b). Therefore contradictions in
the system of knowledge, a disconnect between knowledge and
instincts, the lost synthesis, lead to internal crises and may
cause clinical depressions. When psychic states missing synthesis
preoccupy majority of population, knowledge loses its value,
including knowledge of social organization, cultural calamities
occur, wars and destructions (Diamond, 1997; Perlovsky, 2006a,
2007b, 2012d). Evolution of culture requires a balance between
differentiation and synthesis. Differentiation is the very essence
of cultural evolution. But it may lead to emotional disconnect
between conceptual knowledge and instinctual needs, to the lost
feeling of the meaning and purpose, including the purpose of any
cultural knowledge, and to cultural destruction.
There is much evidence that languages differ in their
emotional and conceptual contents (Guttfreund, 1990; Buchanan
et al., 2000; Harris et al., 2003; Perlovsky, 2007a,b, 2009b,
2012d). While all contemporary languages lost involuntary
connections between sounds and emotions characterizing animal
vocalizations, this “hardwired” connections between voice and
emotions has been replaced by habitual connections. As long as
sounds of a language remain unchanged, the language maintains
historical connections between word sounds and associated
emotions. But if sounds of a language change fast, this historical
connections might be lost.
A significant mechanism affecting a speed of language
sound change and therefore emotionality of the language is
word morphology, such as inflections expressing grammatical
cases, voices, aspects, genders, numbers, tenses, and other
constructs. A strongly inflected language may have dozens or
even many dozens of inflections expressed by affixes and other
grammatical devices. Every child hears these affixes every day,
therefore knows how to pronounce them, even if does not
know which grammatical category it expresses and when it
should be used. In inflectional languages, like most European
languages, pronunciation of affixes is to some extent fused with
pronunciation of the word roots. Therefore positions of laryngeal
muscles for pronouncing word roots should be concordant with
pronouncing affixes. Sounds of affixes control to some extent
sounds of roots. Affixes are “tale that wag the dog,” like anchors
keeping the word sounds, and therefore historical emotions.
Languages with many affixes tend to keep their sounds changes
slow.
For example, Middle English, similar to other Germanic
languages, had a number of inflections. About 500 years ago
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 84
Perlovsky Physics of the Mind
during transition to Modern English most of inflections have
been lost (remaining inflections include “ed” for the past tense
and “s” for plurals). English lost anchors for its sounds, and
sounds of English started changing fast (Lerer, 2007). English
sounds significantly change in each generation. e.g., a well know
change is the Great Vowel Shift. Much less research have been
devoted to losing historical connections between word semantic
meanings and corresponding emotions. This has led to low
emotionality of contemporary English.
This low emotionality makes English a powerful tool of
semantic thinking. Ancient emotions determined by language
sounds and unrelated to semantic contents do not interfere
with the thought train. English is very good for science and
engineering (Perlovsky, 2013c, 2016a). The other side of low
emotionality is that English is losing historical connections
of value words to cultural values evolving over millennia.
Recent generations change cultural values according to current
fads; a lot of people think that this is possible because today
people are smarter than in the old days, and therefore are
not bound by meaningless traditions. It is not appreciated that
this freedom from traditional values (good or bad) is due to
the fact that English language sound are changing fast and
for this reason English is literally “losing anchors,” which is
not a guarantee that current fads are better than millennial
traditions.
On the “other side” of language emotionality is Arabic
language. It is a fusional language, in which inflections are
strongly fused with word roots. It follows that sounds of Arabic
change slowly (if at all). Semantic meanings of Arabic words are
strongly connected to historically ancient emotions. Arabic may
not be flexible for scientific thinking. But Arabic moral values are
strongly rooted in history. Many Arabic people therefore are sure
about theirmoral values. It is important to appreciate that current
contradictions between Arabic and English speaking cultures do
not depend on specific political leaders, but are rooted in the very
sounds of Arabic and English languages (Perlovsky, 2009b, 2011a,
2012d).
Again, this section gives an example of a vast field of
complicated cognitive and language mechanisms as well as
their affects on cultures. A vast field of knowledge is explained
from the first principles; a theory makes predictions that can
be tested in experiments; few of these predictions have been
tested experimentally, these are directions for future research.
It answers many questions that could not even have been
formulated previously. Mathematical models are discussed in
given references. The theory discussed in this section is a part
of physics of the mind, it is a step toward making psychology a
“hard” science.
COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS OF MUSIC
Cognitive functions of music, the reasons for its evolution
from pre-human vocalizations to Beethoven, Chopin, and Justin
Bieber could not have been understood. Aristotle (1995) asked
“why music being just sounds reminds the states of soul?” Kant
could not understand the role of music in cognition Kant (1790).
Darwin (1871) thought that music is the “greatest mystery.” And
contemporary musicologists could not find an answer (Editorial,
2008; Honing et al., 2015).
An explanation of music cognitive functions have been
derived from the dual model (Perlovsky, 2006a, 2010a, 2012b,c,
2013a, 2014, 2015a,b). Evolution of language led to explosion of
knowledge and a number of concepts. Concepts contradict other
concepts to some extent. These contradictions among concepts
dissatisfy the knowledge instinct and produce unpleasant
emotions, cognitive dissonances (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive
dissonances are immediately resolved: the new contradictory
knowledge is discarded fast and usually without reaching
consciousness (Jarcho et al., 2011). It follows that evolution
of language, cognition, and culture required a cognitive
mechanism for overcoming cognitive dissonances without
rejecting knowledge.
This mechanism had to act fast and to be related to language.
And this mechanism existed since the beginning of language
evolution, it is language prosody. Low-emotional prosody is
overcoming minute cognitive dissonances present in everyday
choices. Overcoming stronger cognitive dissonances, which
appeared with evolution of language and culture, dissonances
related to unrequited love, betrayals by friends and loved one,
required stronger emotions. These stronger emotions appeared
in songs, an ability which eventually evolved into music
(Perlovsky, 2006c, 2016a,b,c).
This theory which relates music evolution to cognitive
dissonances explains why many people enjoy listening to sad
music. Some music is so sad it cannot be listened without tears.
Listeners of the BBC’s Today program in 2004 voted Barber’s
Adagio for Strings the “saddest classical” work ever. It is among
the highest-selling classical music piece. The physical theory of
the mind described here explains a mysterious power of music
over us as well as Biblical statement: “in much wisdom is much
grief” (Ecc. 1:18). For we leave in the sea of cognitive dissonances,
in the sea of grief.Music helps us overcome the grief of knowledge
and to continue developing the culture.
The theoretical prediction, resolving the millennial mystery
of music by relating it to cognitive dissonances have been
confirmed experimentally (Masataka and Perlovsky, 2012a,b,
2013; Cabanac et al., 2013; Perlovsky et al., 2013). This theory
opens a vast field for future research, including experimental
measurements of musical emotion, e.g., what is the emotional
distance between a musical phrase from Beethoven and another
musical phrase from Chopin. How many musical emotions
exist?
DYNAMIC LOGIC, DL
DL is a mathematical technique modeling the knowledge
instinct, or more specifically, the brain-mind mechanism of
matching vague top-down signals to bottom-up signals without
computational complexity (Perlovsky and McManus, 1991;
Perlovsky, 2001, 2006a,b; Perlovsky et al., 2011; Vityaev et al.,
2011; Kovalerchuk et al., 2012; Perlovsky and Shevchenko, 2014).
It is a mathematical foundation of the physics of the mind and all
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results discussed in this paper. It is a fundamental principle of the
mind describing the process from vague to crisp representations.
The mathematical description, following (Perlovsky et al.,
2011) is given below. An index m numbers top representations;
an index n numbers bottom representations; an index i numbers
BU signals making up the n-th representation. Parameters xni
measure the strength of association of the BU signal i with bottom
representation n, and pmi measure the strength of association
of the BU signal i with top representation m. Values of these
parameter are limited between 0 and 1. Associations between top
and bottom representations are modeled by
f(m|n) = r(m) (n|m)/
∑
m′∈M
r(m′) (n|m′). (1)
(n|m) =
∏
i=1
pxnimi (1− pmi)
(1−xni) (2)
Here (n |m) are pdf-like measures, and f(m|n) are probabilities-
like measures, similar to a posteriori Bayes probabilities. Under
certain conditions, these variables indeed can be interpreted
as probabilistic measures. For preserving these probabilistic
interpretations (n |m) is defined so that integration over x
yields 1. And parameters r(m) are used to model the proportion
of signals m in top-down representations. These representations
model a single level in the hierarchical mental structure; at the
lowest level of the hierarchy xni represent sensor signals: if a
feature i is present in object or event n, xni = 1, otherwise 0.
Learning in DL processes constitutes adapting parameters
pmi and r(m) so that top representations m correspond to
patterns in bottom representations xni. This process maximizes
a total similarity measure between all bottom patterns and top
representations,
L({n}, {m}) =
∏
n∈N
∑
m∈M
r(m) (n|m). (3)
Maximizing this similarity is a model of KI.
The learning process maximizing KI (Perlovsky et al., 2011)
can be specified iteratively,
pit+1mi = p
it
mi + dt
∑
n
f(m|n)[ ln (n|m)/ pmi]
it, (4)
fit+1(m|n) = [r(m) (n|m)/
∑
m′∈M
r(m′) (n|m′)]it, (5)
rit+1(m) = [(1/N)/
∑
n
f(m|n)]it, (6)
In equation (4) a parameter dt is an increment of the internal
time t of the DL iterations. A fundamental aspect of the DL
learning is an initial vague state, which is achieved by specifying
the unknown parameter values pmi near 0.5. This value of
pmi corresponds to maximal variances of (n|m) and vague
representations f(m|n). This state corresponds to the Aristotelian
potentiality. In the process of perception, “mind meets matter,”
FIGURE 3 | Perception of “smile” and “frown” patterns in noise, an example of dynamic logic “from vague-to-crisp” process: (A) true “smile” and “frown”
patterns are shown without noise; (B) actual image available for recognition (signals are below noise, signal-to-noise ratio is about 1/3); (C) an initial vague
concept-model; (D) through (H) show improved concept-models at various iteration stages (total of 21 iterations). Between stages (D) and (E) DL tries to fit the data
with more than one model and decided, that it needs three models to “understand” the content of the data. Until stage (G) the DL “thought” in terms of simple blob
models, at (G) and beyond, the algorithm decided that it needs more complex parabolic models to describe the data. Iterations stopped at (H), when similarity (3)
stopped increasing.
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TD and BU signals interact and representations reach crisp states
corresponding to the Aristotelian actualities. We show in an
example below that this process converges fast.
In this example, Figure 3. illustrates the DL perception of
“smile” and “frown” patterns in noise. Patterns without noise are
shown in A; with noise, as actually measured they are shown in B.
When models come close to the true shape, iteration 17,
Figure 3G, there is sufficient sensitivity to determine that
parabolic shapes better match signals, three parabolic shapes are
activated. At iteration 21, Figure 3H, iterations stop, because
similarity (3) stopped increasing with iterations. The number
of computer operations in this example was about 109. Thus,
a problem that was not solvable due to CC becomes solvable
using DL.
To summarize this example, during DL learning initial vague
and uncertain models (Aristotelian potentialities) are associated
with structures in the input signals (Aristotelian forms interact
with matter), and vague models become more definite and crisp
with successive iterations. In the image available for recognition,
Figure 3B, signal is below noise, signal-to-noise ratio is about
0.3. This is a significant improvement over other state-of-the-
art practically working algorithms; a standard required signal-to-
noise ratio is more than 30. The achieved improvement is about
100 times.
The above formulation of DL includes dual models as
well as the dual hierarchy. Some xni and pmi correspond to
cognitive representations and other correspond to language
representations. Language representations exist in surrounding
language and are learned early in life. Cognitive representations
are learned from experience under guidance of existing language
representations. Existing preliminary simulations of systems
with cognitive and language data indicate that interactions of
cognition and language can self-organize by association of both
types of representations in a single model. This process could
be speeded up if certain associations among vague models are
inborn. Understanding inborn associations is a future research
direction.
Adequacy of DL for modeling neural mechanisms of
perception has been experimentally proven in (Bar et al., 2006;
Kveraga et al., 2007).
CONCLUSION
This paper establishes a new area of science, physics of the mind.
Physics of the mind, let’s repeat is methodologically similar to all
areas of physics in identifying few fundamental principles and
their mathematical models, a general mathematical model built
from these few principles, describing a vast area of knowledge,
and making experimentally testable predictions. Experimental
tests of these predictions confirm or disconfirm the theory.
Physicists know that the very first test of a scientific theory is
its elegance and beauty; these include Einstein (see McAllister,
1999), Poincare (2001), Dirac (1982). The beauty of a scientific
theory is its ability to describe a vast area of knowledge
from few basic principles, and to make experimentally testable
predictions. The actual experimental tests are the final proof of
the theory. Currently a number of theoretical prediction have
been experimentally confirmed, even so they are unexpected and
go against accepted views.
Still a number of predictions remain to be confirmed, a vast
area of theoretical and experimental development is opened
for future research. Traditional psychology is a “soft” science
that does not develop mathematical models of the mind self-
organization based on few principles, describing vast areas of
knowledge, and making experimentally verifiable predictions. A
new area of science physics of the mind extends psychology
toward “hard” sciences.
Opportunities for unified areas of research arise in place of
former misunderstandings and contradictions.
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